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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

DIA:NIOND T UTAH, INC.,
\
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
CO MP ANY, a corporation authorized
to do business in the State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12628

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action by plaintiff to recover property damage
under an insurance policy issued by defendant resulted
in a summary judgment for defendant which was reversed by this Court and remanded for trial.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
Upon remand, a trial without jury was held in Salt
Lake County District Court. The Honorable Stewart .M.
Hanson rendered judgment in favor of defendant Travelers Indemnity Company.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent Travelers Indemnity Company seeks affirmance of the judgment of the District
Court.

OF THE FACTS
Defendant does not agree with plaintiff's contention in its "Statement of Facts" that the issue at trial
was merely whether the vehicle was taken "without permission" and defendant further wishes to expand upon
the facts stated by plaintiff.
The parties are herein referred to as they appeared
below. In January, 1961, plaintiff sold to one David
Scott a tractor-trailer under a conditional sales contract.
The paper was then assigned to Pacific Finance Company and shortly thereafter Mr. Scott defaulted on his
payments (Ex. 5-d). In June, 1961, an agent of Pacific
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together with an agent of David Scott, in .Madison, Wisconsin, moved the tractor-trailer from one location in
Madison to another, parking the vehicle on or near a
public street in Madison (Ex. 4-d) . A short time after
this moving, a conversation took place involving J.\ilr.
Scott, agents of Pacific and an agent of plaintiff concerning installment payments under the conditional contract (Ex. 4-d; R. 12, 18). On the same day of these
conversations, Scott removed the vehicle from the location where it had been parked in J.\iladison, without
interference or objection (R. 18, 19). The vehicle was
not reported stolen to the police or to anyone else ( R.
16).
Agents of Pacific located the vehicle some time
later after it was damaged in an accident, apparently in
South Bend, Indiana ( R. 43) . The vehicle was then repossessed and returned to plaintiff.
Following these events, Pacific made a claim
against plaintiff for the unpaid balance on the vehicle,
because plaintiff unconditionally guaranteed the purchaser's obligations on the purchase ( R. 24) . Pursuant
to such claim, Pacific set off the claimed amount from
an amount owed plaintiff on a certain "reserve contract;"
plaintiff countered with a lawsuit against Pacific for
the amount of the setoff and for the damage to the vehicle. At the same time plaintiff claimed that defendant
Travelers was liable on the Automobile Dealer's Insurance Policy which covered vehicles held for sale by plaintiff at the time of a theft or damage. That policy un-

ambiguously excluded vehicles which had been sold by
plaintiff ( R. 48) .
The District Court entered summary judgment for
defendant and for Pacific, and plaintiff appealed. During appeal time, Pacific and plaintiff settled their dispute; this Court then reversed the District Court judgment in Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. 1'ravelers Indemnity
Company, 21 U.2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 ( 1968), and remanded the case for trial on "the one genuine issue of
fact that remains, to-wit: whether the vehicle in question
was in fact stolen . . . " In that opinion this Court
assumed that the agreement between Pacific Finance
and plaintiff (the "side agreements") coupled with their
performance, vested in plaintiff an insurable interest in
the vehicle should the vehicle prove to be stolen. That
opinion should not have prevented defendant at remand
from proving the lack of an insurable interest in spite of
the "side agreements." However, the trial court refused
to allow evidence on this material issue of fact ( R. 3, 4),
notwithstanding the lack of any indication in the record
as to the effect of the "side agreements." This Court's
statement that the parties had no dispute as to the duties
under such agreements was true only because on a summary judgment motion the movant accepts the factual
contentions of his adversary arguendo, but such acceptance is not a conclusive admission, and does not limit
proof at a later time on a material issue of fact. In any
event, the trial court found that the Yehicle was not
stolen, and of course heard no evidence on the issue of
damages ( R. 208) .

4

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IS PRESUMED CORRECT
AND PLAINTIFF THUS FAILS TO STATE'
GROUNDS UPON WHICH REVERSAL MAY
BE GRANTED.
In this case, the trial court stated in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law the following:
"

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff failed to produce any competent
evidence to show that the tractor-trailer in question was a stolen vehicle and all of the offered
evidence concerning that material fact was hearsay and inadmissible. Therefore, the court must
find the tractor-trailer was not a stolen vehicle.
2. If the evidence which was offered to show
that the tractor-trailer was stolen was admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule it is just
as reasonable to infer that the vehicle was stolen
as it was to infer that it was not stolen. There
is not a preponderance of the evidence and therefore this court must conclude and find that the
tractor-trailer was not stolen.

*

*

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff has failed
sustain its burden
proving the tractor-trailer was stolen . . . .

Id., R. 157.
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The trial court thus held that first, all of the offered evidence concerning the issue in point was hearsay and
second, even if such evidence was admissible, that evidence still failed to carry plaintiff's burden of proof.
Thus, even if plaintiff is correct in its contention that
the evidence in question was admissible, the trial court
nonetheless concluded that the burden of proof was not
met.
In its brief, plaintiff has contended that its evidence
was "competent and sufficient" to prove the point in
question, and that there was other "competent evidence"
at the trial to "support appellant's contention." (Brief
of Appellant at 4 and 10). Even if this Court were to
agree with plaintiff there is no basis for reversal because
in Utah, as in most other states, the finder of fact is accorded broad discretion. A finding of fact will be reversed only if all reasonable minds would have concluded contrary to the trial court, and if there is any
reasonable basis for the judge's finding, the decision
should be affirmed. Further, the evidence relied upon by
plaintiff is not relevant to this appeal inasmuch as the
reviewing court is to look to the trial evidence to the
exclusion of all unfavorable evidence and is to decide
only whether the evidence which exists in favor of the
trial court's decision forms a reasonable basis for that
decision (see decisions cited below). The following rule
is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, with ten full pages
of citations to support the point made:
" ... Questions of fact in actions at law are to
be tried and determined in the court of original
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jurisdiction, and not in an appellate court exercising strictly the functions of a court of review.
The probative force of evidence is for the consideration of the triers of the facts in the court
below, and the appellate court ordinarily cannot
consider the weight of evidence. Similar expressions of the general principle stated are that
questions of fact determined below will not be
disturbed on appeal where the evidence is conflicting, ... where the determination of the facts
would support an action of the court below in
either one of two ways, ... and the rule applies
notwithstanding a finding of fact is apparently
against the weight or preponderance of the evidence, that different minds might arrive at opposite conclusions on a consideration of the evidence, ... and the reviewing court will not search
the record to determine conflicting claims, ... "
5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1642.
Countless Utah cases have stated the law as noted
above. Thus, in the case of Green v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 3 U.2d 375, 284 P.2d 695 (1955), this
Court stated :
"This being a law action the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported a
judgment in favor of
but .whether the
judgment entered by the trial court fmds support
in the evidence." Id., 3 U.2d at 377.
This Court has stated that on appeal it will not look to
evidence not favorable to the trial court's decision. Thus,
Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 18 U.2d 3,
in Hoggan
414 P.2d 89 (1966), the Court stated:
"At the outset it appears that defendants have
leaned largely on facts favorable to themselves,
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to the exclusion of other facts of rather contradictory nature that appear in the record.
Smee plaintiff prevailed in this case, under
familiar rules of appeal, this court must do the
opposite." Id., 18 U.2d at 5. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491
(1967), the Court stated that mere disagreement with
the trial court was not sufficient for reversal:
"The trial court found under disputed competent evidence that the parties had mutually
abandoned the contract; and when there is competent evidence to support such a finding, we are
not permitted to substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court even if we should disagree
with his finding. " Id., 18 U.2d at 371.
In fact, Utah law holds that the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and
that the findings of a trial court are presumed to be correct. In the case of Sullivan v. Turner, 22 U.2d 85, 448
P.2d 907 (1968), it was stated:
" ... 'Vhen the trial judge made findings of fact
and entered judgment thereon, they are entitled
to the presumption of correctness; on appeal the
evidence is surveyed in the light favorable to
them; and if there is any reasonable basis in the
evidence to support them they will not be overturned." Id., 22 U.2d at 89. (Emphasis supplied.)
As was stated in Jacobson v. Swan, 3 U.2d 59, 278 P.2d
294 (1954):
" ... When the trial judge has made such deter·
mination, we will regard it as prima facie correct
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and will not disturb it unless it is plainly erroneous." Id., 3 U.2d at 65.
Similarly, in Lemmon v.
Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., 9 U.2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 ( 1959), it was
stated:
" '* * * I"f* * * t he court is
. m
. d oubt whether reasonable men* *might arrive at different concluthen this very doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the jury and not one of
law for the court.'" Id., 9 U.2d at 204.
Lastly, in the case of Ha.nks v. Hales, 17 U.2d 344, 411
P.2d836 (1966), the Court ruled that:
"Whether the required quantum of proof has
been met is for the trial court to determine. When
it has done so, we could rule to the contrary only
if all reasonable minds would so believe from the
evidence." Id., 17 U.2d at 347.
Over a score of Utah cases are all to the same effect.
Casey v. Nelson Bros. Construction Company, 24 U.2d
14, 465 P.2d 173 (1970); Santi v.
Rio Grande
Western Railroad Co., 1U.2d157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968);
Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 19 U.2d 119, 427
P.2d 387 ( 1967); Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18
U.2d 122, 417P.2d132 (1966); Christensen v. Christensen, 9 U.2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959); De Vas v. Noble,
13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 ( 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 821 (1962).
The above cases are only representative of the many
Utah decisions on this point. According to the above
body of law, this Court need only decide from the record
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whether there was any reasonable basis for the trial
court's decision, and if such basis is found, then the Court
is compelled to go no further.
II. THE RECORD DISCLOSES A REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF
PROOF WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
A. The Evidence Relied Upon by Plaintiff is Both
Inadmissible Hearsay and Insufficient to Sustain Plaintiff's Burden of Proof.
Within its brief, plaintiff relies upon the following
evidence:
(1) Exhibit 2-p, a letter from Mr. 0. L. Shapley, of the Salt Lake City Branch of Pacific
Finance to Mr. C. J. Hansen of the Madison,
Wisconsin Branch of Pacific Finance. Mr.
Shapley did not appear at the trial to testify
nor was there a showing of his unavailability;
(2) Exhibit 4-d, a letter to Mr. Shapley from

Mr. Hansen, containing first, a recapitulation of a telephone conversation between
Shapley and Scott; second, alleged statements made bv one Cheves; third, a recapitulation of certain actions taken concerning the
vehicle in question; fourth, a report of a
versation with certain individuals at the business establishment in lVIadison, containing
within that conversation a further report of
statements allegedly made by
Scott;
fifth, a report of a conversation with Nelson;
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and sixth, a report of a conversation with
Nelson concerning what Scott told Nelson·
'
(3) Exhibit 5-d, an unsworn and undated "statement" of Mr. Shapley, in which he reports a
telephone conversation with one Chase included in that conversation being the
stance of Chase's conversation with one
Scott; a report of a telephone call to Mr.
Hansen in Wisconsin; and a report of a
statement of an attendant in "\Visconsin; and
( 4) The testimony of Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson at the
trial, concerning a conversation that he had
with Mr. Scott ( R. 205) .
1. The evidence espoused by plaintiff is inadmissible hearsay.
a. All evidence was properly objected to at
trial.
The introduction of Exhibit 2-p was objected to at
trial (R. 178), as was the testimony by
Wilkinson
concerning a past telephone conversation ( R. 204) . Exhibits 4-d and 5-d were introduced by defendant, and
were properly excluded by the judge, notwithstanding
plaintiff's argument (See Brief of Appellant at 12).
Mr. Larsen, counsel for defendant, introduced Exhibits
4-d and 5-d for the limited purpose of rebutting the hearsay introduced by plaintiff, and Mr. Larsen specifically
objected to the evidence (Exhibits 4-d and 5-d) when he
stated, in ref erring to these exhibits, "I submit, your
Honor, that all these business records are hearsay" (R.
193, line 27). Plaintiff also objected to such evidence
(R. 193). Plaintiff's argument concerning the necessity

for a "renewal" of such objection is without merit because, first, defendant's objection was as a matter of fact
renewed in its brief for the trial court following the trial,
and second, the rule cited by plaintiff (Brief of Appellant at 12) applies only where evidence has been received by the court following an earlier admission subject to an objection which was never renewed. At trial
below, the Court excluded the evidence, ruling that it
was hearsay (R. 157), while plaintiff's own citation indicates that the "renewal" rule only applies where no ruling has been made, and that when a ruling is made, the
purpose of the rule is satisfied:
"Where evidence is received upon a trial, subject
to a future ruling on its admissibility, the party
wishing to avail himself thereof should, at the
proper time, secure a ruling thereon .... " 53 Am
J ur Trials § 146.
Thus, a ruling was secured in the instant case, and the
issue became moot.
In any event the law is clear that a court has discretion to exclude inadmissible evidence even without
"renewal" of objection:
"'Vhere evidence is admitted conditionally, it is
notice to both parties that thereafter the court
may strike part or all of it, ... * * *The
that
the trial court admits a document
does not deprive it of the power to exclude it
afterward, especially where it expressly
the right to take any course at the
of
the case with respect to the document. 88 C.J.S.
Trial§ 85.
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In this connection, Judge Hansen stated at trial that the
evidence in question was admitted subject to objections,
and that no objections were waived (R. 178, 193, 204,
205). Further, evidence may be excluded by the trial
court even without any objection at all by either party:
"Where evidence is manifestly improper, the
court may, in its discretion, reject it whether or
not it is properly objected to." 88 C.J.S. Trial§
90.

* * *

" ... [I}n the exercise of its right to control and
regulate the conduct of the trial, [the court) may
of its own motion exclude or strike evidence which
is wholly incompetent or inadmissible for any
purpose, even though no objection is interposed
to such evidence." Id., § 156.
See also Sorenson v. Smith, 129 P. 757 (Ore. 1913).
b. Exhibits 2-p, 4-d and 5-d are hearsay and
do not qualify under the business entry exception to the hearsay rule.
The three exhibits in question are, of course, statements made out of court, introduced to prove their truth.
Such hearsay statements are not admissible as "business
entries" merely because they may be found within a
party's business files.
In his treatise on evidence, Professor McCormick
notes the origin of the business entry rule as being twofold:

"First the element of unusual reliability ... bebooks are customarily checked as to
cause
correctness by systematic balance-striking, be-
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cause the very regularity and continuity of such
records is calculated to train the record-keeper in
habits of precision, . . ."
Evidence
§ 281 ( 1954) . (Emphasis supplied.)
Professor .:McCormick notes that the original "Shop
Book Rule" dealt mainly with figures written in shop
books. In this case the statements recorded in Exhibits
2-p, 4-d and 5-d are a far cry from regular entries made
in books or records but rather are for the most part mere
letters concerning an isolated incident, and abounding
with self-serving hearsay statements. These exhibits certainly do not entail the "unusual reliability" originally
contemplated by the Shop Book Rule. Utah cases have
made it clear that the business entry exception applies
primarily to entries in journals, ledgers and regularly
employed charts or sheets. In the case of Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Co., 6 U.2d 367, 314 P.2d 350 (1957), the
Court on page 370 of that decision stated the shop-book
rule to be one allowing documents into evidence
" ' ... where original book entries, documents or
other data are so numerous, complex or cumbersome that they cannot be convenielltly examined
by the fact trier, .. .' "
The cases cited by plaintiff are not to the contrary but
rather demonstrate the fact that such records to be admissible, are ledger-type records and not correspondence.
Plaintiff's cases dealt with bank records of a loan
(Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank
Trust Co., 122
Utah 268) ; telephone company records (State v. Davie,
121 Utah 189) and regularly kept hospital records (In
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re Richards Estate, 5 U.2d 106). This point was highlighted in plaintiff's brief, where in citing the Davie case,
the rule was ref erred to as "the regular entry rule." N 0
law whatsoever was cited by plaintiff to the effect that
letters from a party's correspondence file even border on
being admissible hearsay under the business entry rule.
If
were true, then a party would be able to introduce its entire self-serving correspondence file without
any more than a declaration that such letters were kept
in the regular course of business.
In fact, the law is clear that letters are nothing more
than normal hearsay and are not admissible under the
business entry exception:
"Letters and telegrams may be excluded ... where
they constitute hearsay evidence, as when they
are written by third persons under circumstances
not rendering them binding on the parties against
whom they are offered and they are offered to
prove the truth of recitals therein. Likewise, they
may be excluded as self-serving, * * * where it
contains mere legal conclusions, or mere speculation or conjecture." 32 C.J.S. Evidence,§ 703.
A number of cases have indicated that the mere
presence of a document in a business's correspondence
file does not entitle such document to the status of a
business record. In the case of Standard Oil Company
of California v. Moore, 251F.2d188 (9th Cir. 1958),
the Court dealt with a business records rule established
by statute and noted that on a number of the papers in
question there were initials or other marks to indicate
that the paper had come from one or more of the com-
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pany's officials. However, the Court ruled that in most
instances:
" ... it was not established that the internal procedures of the company require that such writing
be prepared, transmitted, and filed systematically, or as a matter of routine. Concerning almost
all of the items comprising the grist of interoffice
memoranda and letters which were introduced
the non-existence of any such company
dure
almost self-evident. They were patently mtended as communications between employees, and not as records of company activity.
Many of them were casual and informal in nature,
seeking or providing information of a kind which
could be, and no doubt of ten was, communicated
by telephone or in conference. Most of them were
apparently written as a result of the exercise of
individual judgment and discretion." Id., 251
F.2d at 215.
The Court went on to note that the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff to show that it was regularly established business procedure to make such memoranda at
the time of the act, and that in the case before it, the
burden had not been met.
Certainly, the same applies to the exhibits in this
case, which were introduced upon the mere foundational
statements that they were made in the regular course of
business. Nowhere was it shown that it was a systematic
requirement of the business to make such documents for
the record. A holding on this point was set forth in the
case of Rodenberg v. Nickles, 357 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1962) , wherein the Court held that a letter from a
doctor reporting his examination of the plaintiff was in-
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admissible as a business record. The Court stated that
the document was not a record "made in the regular
course of business" of the doctor but rather had been
written three months after the examination and addressed to the plaintiff's attorney. Such letter is very
similar to the "statement" seen in Exhibit 5-d. Also on
point is the case of Fuller v. White, 201 P.2d 16 (Calif.
1949), wherein a letter was held not to qualify as a business record. The letter was from an insurance company's
supervisor to the company's general agent and contained
information concerning an application for a life insurance policy. The Court held that the letter was no more
than a recital by the supervisor of his interpretation of
other statements. The Court further noted that the statements in the letter were clearly not a record of a loan
between the parties to the note in question. Similarly, in
this case, the statements made in the offered exhibits
were not official records, but were merely communications and recitals by their authors of certain events.
Other cases on point include Smith v . .!ones, 203 A.2d
865 (Md. 1964); Picker X-Ray Corporation v. Frerker,
405 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1969); and Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Sika Chemical Corp., 161
S.E.2d 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
In sum, the exhibits at issue are not the sort of evidence contemplated by the business entry rule, viz., figures and journal entries, and were never shown to have
been recorded as part of a systematic, necessary and required process. Such statements do not qualify as business entries under the hearsay rule.
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c.
was no proof of necessity for the introduction of Exhibits 2-p, 4-d and 5-d and
exhibits thus fail to qualify as bus'iness
entries.
In outlining the second major requirement under
the business entry exception, Professor McCormick
stated:
" ... [S}econdly, the necessity for resort to such
hearsay statements appears . . . only when the
person ... who made the entry . . . (is) unavailable .... " McCormick, Evidence. § 281 (1954).
(Emphasis supplied.)
This second basis for the business exception also
disappears in the present case when it is noted that at no
time was any necessity shown for the introduction of the
records in question because none of the drafters of the
letters in question were ever demonstrated to be unavailable.
Utah law is in line with this reasoning. Perhaps the
leading case is that of Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 ( 1938), wherein
this Court recognized the Shop-Book Rule but ref used to
apply the rule where it was offered by a witness without
any showing that the method of compilation was such as
to guarantee trustworthiness. The Court stated:
"Before such records can be admitted, in the absence of a statute, the offering party must show
the necessity of admitting the records without requiring the person or several persons who made
the records to testify. * * * Appe11ant offered no
explanation of why the nurse who took the appe?dix from the surgeon, ... was not called as a w1t-
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ness. Such a
based on necessity should
have
laid before the hearsay was admissible.
In refusu_ig to receive this sheet of the hospital
records without further evidence of identification
or unavailability of witncssfs the district court
committed no error." Id., 96 Utah at 340, 341.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Clayton case was affirmed by reference in the case
of Carpenter Paper Co. v. Brannock, 14 U.2d 34, 376
P.2d939 (1962).
Because plaintiff never demonstrated the unavailability of any of the drafters of the statements in question, such statements may not qualify as business entries.
d. Exhibits 5-d and 2-p are inadmissible under the business entry exception because they
were not timely recorded.
Exhibits 5-d and 2-p do not qualify under the business records exception to the hearsay rule because these
exhibits were not recorded within a short time after the
occurrence of events or transactions which they supposedly record. The moving of the vehicle in question took
place on June 16, 1961 (R. 3), while Exhibit 2-p was
written nearly two months following that event. Exhibit
5-d is hearsay of the rankest form, being unverified and
undated. By no stretch of the imagination can Exhibit
5-d, a self-serving, undated statement be considered to
be a business record. As stated by McCormick:
"Obviouslv, the reliability of any system of business records depends largely upon the promptness ·with which transaction<; are recorded. Ac-
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cordingly, cases and text-writers formulate the
requirement that the entry must be 'at or near the
time of the transaction recorded,' or 'at the time
or nearly so of the principal fact,' or 'at or reasonably near the time of the transaction.' " McCormick, Evidence, § 285 ( 1954).
Hence, these exhibits, for this further reason, do not
qualify as "business records.''
2. Even if admissible as business records, exhibits
4-d and 5-d contain further hearsay statements
which are inadmissible.
Concerning the specific substance of Exhibit 4-d,
it is obvious that the letter contains more than a mere
record of transactions. Rather, the letter contains at least
six instances of further hearsay, i.e., hearsay within hearsay. Thus, inasmuch as the letter does not qualify under
the business record rule, the letter plus its contents are
double hearsay and triple hearsay. Nowhere in its brief
does plaintiff contend that in addition to the letter being
admissible as a business record, the specific contents
within the letter (namely, further hearsay) are admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. If the law
were what plaintiff apparently believes it to be, an individual could report double, triple and quadruple hearsay
within a letter, merely place the letter in his business
files, and such evidence would be admissible in court. An
example of this "double" hearsay is seen in Rule 66,
Uniform Rules of Evidence (now in force in Utah)
which states that a hearsay statement which is admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule is still inadmis-
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sible if that statement includes within it a further statement which is hearsay, unless "such included statement
itself meets the requirements of an exception." In the
Utah case of Russell v. Ogden Union Railway, 122 Utah
107, 247 P.2d 257 ( 1952), this type of double hearsay
was dealt with by the court where a transcript was properly received in evidence (analogous to this case where
plaintiff seeks to introduce a letter as a business record)
but where the Court stated that the testimony within the
transcript was hearsay and "should not have been considered by the court as substantive evidence .... " Id., at
114.

The above discussion of Exhibit 4-d applies in a
like manner to Exhibit 5-d which does not qualify as a
business record and which, even if qualifying as a business record, contains at least four instances of double or
triple hearsay which were not even contended by plaintiff to be admissible under any exception to the hearsay
rule. Exhibits 4-d and 5-d were properly excluded at
trial.
3. The telephone conversation, as related by Mr. 0.

J. Wilkinson, is hearsay and thus inadmissible.

The telephone conversation between David Scott
and 0. J. Wilkinson, as testified to by the latter (R.
205) is hearsay of the most unreliable type, being selfserving in the first degree and not demonstrated to be
admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule.
Further David Scott was not called to testify by plaintiff, nor' was there any showing of his unavailability.
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Contrary to plaintiff's contention, this issue was not
settled by the Supreme Court merely because the Court,
in its first decision, made reference to such a telephone
call. The Court in that decision (Diamond T Utah, Inc.
v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 21 U.2d 124) never
purported to act as a finder of fact, and in fact according to its own decisions, has no authority to act as a finder of fact. Nor could it be said that the Court, in the
language noted in plaintiff's brief, was sustaining any
finding of fact by a lower court inasmuch as no trial had
been held below, the matter coming to the Supreme Court
on a summary judgment issue. When the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the District Court to decide
the issue of whether the vehicle was stolen, the former
Court impliedly authorized the latter Court to consider
and rule upon all evidence pertinent to that issue. Thus,
the conversation in question was properly considered by
the trial court and excluded as being hearsay.
4. Even if admissible, the evidence relied upon by
plaintiff, taken in toto, is at best insufficient.

As noted above, the trial court held that even if the
evidence relied upon by plaintiff was admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule, plaintiff still failed to
show by a preponderance of evidence that the vehicle
was stolen. Thus, the Court ruled against plaintiff-ap·
pellant even upon consideration of all of the evidence in
favor of that party (R. 157).
Although in view of the trial court's ruling, it is not
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necessary to do so it is easily demonstrable that the evidence relied upon by plaintiff fails to prove the vehicle
was stolen. The insurance policy in question covered loss
or damage to an automobile "caused by theft, larceny,
robbery or pilferage" (R. 49). As noted in the Supreme
Court's decision, plaintiff here contends that the vehicle
"was a stolen car under the provisions of the insurance
contract .... " Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 21 U.2d at 126. Appellant, being plaintiff,
had the burden of proof on that issue. The law is clear
that one claiming under a theft clause of an insurance
policy must prove theft within the ordinary common law
meaning. As stated in Couch on Insurance 2d:
"As a general rule, words such as 'theft,' 'robbery,' 'pilferage,' etc., should, unless the context
requires a different construction, be given their
usual, ordinary, common-law, technical meaning.
'Theft' is generally construed as stealing or larceny, and 'pilferage' as petty larceny." Id.,§ 42:
249.

Hence, to prove theft under an insurance policy, that is,
to prove the car was "stolen,'' it is necessary to prove a
felonious intent, just as it is in the common-law:
"By regarding 'theft' as synonymous. with
ceny ' an intent to steal, or a felonious mtent as it
is cahed, is held a necessary element of
... Accordingly, where a taking or asportat1.on
fails to be felonious because of the lack of an mtent to steal there is no theft, robbery or pilferage within the scope of the policy." Id., at § 42:
256.
Further:
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". ·. . The insured seeking to recover under the
policy need establish the existence of the taker's
criminal intent, . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id., at § 42 :285.
The so-called thief, Mr. Scott, was not even called
to testify at trial, nor was there proffered his affidavit
with a showing of his unavailability. Further, nowhere
did plaintiff's evidence even tend to indicate that Mr.
Scott had an intent to steal the vehicle in question. Ex·
hibit 5-d indicates that "Mr. Scott had shown up and
took the unit." Exhibit 4-d indicates that Scott found
the unit after it had been moved and in fact that a repre·
sentative of Diamond T "told Scott to get the unit back
on the road and earn some money." Other evidence, in·
eluding Exhibit 2-p, and testimony at the trial by Mr.
Scoville and by Mr. Wilkinson merely indicated that
neither of the persons mentioned nor the branch manager
in Madison, Wisconsin, had given permission to Mr.
Scott to remove the vehicle. Such evidence, taken in toto,
is a far reach from a showing that the vehicle was stolen.
In fact, the evidence in Exhibit 4-d indicates, if any·
thing, that the vehicle was
with the permission of
Mr. Wilkinson. (In its brief, appellant chose to rely on
Exhibit 4-d.) As stated by Couch, concerning the inter·
pretation of an automobile insurance theft policy:
"When an intent to steal is essential to bring con·
duct within the coverage of a theft or similar pol·
icy, it necessarily follows that there i.s n.o
loss where the taking of the automobile is made JD
the bona fide although erroneous belief of owner·
ship or other right to the property. For example,
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there is no theft, robbery, or pilferage within the
coverage of the policy, where the vehicle was taken by one who-believed that he was entitled
thereto,-Had been the former owner and took
the property under a claim of ownership." Couch
on Insurance 2d, § 42:261 (1963).
On point is the case of Bigus v. Pacific Coast Casualty
Co., 129 S."\V. 982 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910), where an action
was brought to recover under a burglary insurance policy on an automobile. In that case an automobile was sold
to plaintiff who then took out an insurance policy on the
automobile. Shortly after the sale, the seller's wife, feeling that the automobile had been wrongly transferred,
located the vehicle and repossessed it. Plaintiff then
brought suit to recover on the insurance policy. The
Court denied recovery, noting that the seller's wife had
a claim to ownership and that:
"They took it in the daytime, through the streets
of the city, without effort at concealment. The insurance contract only covered a felonious asportation and it is manifest that the taking shown
was, at most, a trespass against which there was
no insurance." Id., 129 S.W. at 982.
That case is similar to the present one where Mr. Scott,
apparently believing he owned the vehicle, located it on
an open street, and, having keys of his own simply drove
it away. A further case in defendant's favor is that of
Riley v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., 197 N.E.2d
362 (Ohio, 1964), where the Court interpreted the terms
of an automobile theft insurance policy:
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" 'In an insurance contract insuring against the
"theft" of an automobile, the term "theft" com.
prehends the willful taking or appropriation of
pers<;>n's.
by another wrongfully,
without JUSttftcatwn, and with the design to hold
or make use of the vehicle in violation of the rights
of the owner ... '" Id., 197 N.E.2d at 364.
The Court further stated the rule that:
" ... one is not chargeable with larceny or theft if
in good faith he takes property of another, believ·
ing it to be legally his own and believing that he
has a legal right to its possession." Id., 197 N.E.2d
at 195.
In sum, under the evidence relied upon by plaintiff, the
vehicle in question was no more "stolen" at the time it
was taken by Mr. Scott than it was "stolen" at the time
that it was allegedly "repossessed" by Pacific Finance.
B. Defendant's Evidence, Viewed In The Most
Favorable Light, Was Sufficient To Form A
Reasonable Basis For The Trial Court's De·
ClSIOn.

As noted earlier, the test on review concerning a
finding of fact is whether there was any reasonable
for the trial court's findings. Defendant of course was
not charged with a burden of proof, but the record none·
theless reveals evidence brought forth by defendant
which, in itself, affords a basis for the lower court's find·
ings.

As contended above, Exhibit 4-d, offered by de·
fendant is in fact inadmissible. However, should the
Court
the exhibit and its contents to be admissible,

then it must consider the statement within that exhibit
to the effect that Mr. Scott called Diamond T in Salt
Lake and was told that no permission had been given for
Pacific Finance to repossess the unit, and further that
Scott was to "get the unit back on the road and earn some
money.'· The exhibit further indicates that Scott was
told by Diamond T not to worry about the payments, that
Diamond T would make them. Thus, if plaintiff wishes
to have this Court consider the so-called "business records," then the statements in Exhibit 4-d are persuasive
in defendant's favor.
The record discloses further evidence supporting
the trial court's findings: ( 1) Mr. Scoville of Pacific
Finance stated under cross-examination that he did not
know whether anyone else gave permission to release the
vehicle to Scott ( R. 180) ; ( 2) it was reported to Mr.
Scoville that Scott merely located the vehicle, got in it
and drove it off (R. 184); (3) the vehicle was never reported stolen ( R. 185) ; ( 4) when the vehicle was moved
by Pacific, it was simply parked next to the highway ( R.
187) ; ( 5) there was no attempt to prevent Mr. Scott from
driving the vehicle away on the part of anyone (R. 187) ;
and ( 6) Pacific Finance never received any storage receipt from Chief Auto Parts in \Visconsin, in front of
which the vehicle had been stored after moving, because
the vehicle was never parked inside of Chief Auto Parts
(R. 200, 201). Thus, the facts indicate that after the
\'ehicle was repossessed, Scott, feeling he had the right
to possession, located the vehicle where it had been parked next to a highway (not inside a fenced yard and ap-

not left within the hands of any bailee) . U sini
his own keys, Scott then drove the vehicle away. Tht
evidence thus indicates that Scott re-took the vehicle un.
der a claim of right, especially since he needed the ve
hicle to earn money in order to make payments. Cer
tainly all of this evidence forms a reasonable basis fo
the judge's decision that plaintiff failed to carry its bur·
den of proof in showing that the vehicle was stolen.
III. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL.
At the end of the trial and after the Court's ruling
plaintiff moved for a new trial based upon an affidavit
signed by its attorney, Mr. Wilkinson. The affidavit (B
159) contains the allegation that a new witness, Mr
Hansen, has been located, supposedly the person wh
affected the moving of the vehicle in Madison, Wiscon
sin. The affidavit also recites that the evidence "couk
not with reasonable diligence have been discovered anc
produced at trial."

It is to be borne in mind that the matter of a ne11
trial is within the discretion of the trial court. As W3!
stated in Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc., t
U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965):
"'Vhether these requirements [for a new tria
based on new evidence} have been met res!
largely within the discreti.on of the court,,
less there is a plain showmg of abuse, his act10,
will not be disturbed." Id., 16 U.2d at 340, 341.

Also on point are Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 U.2d
065, 284 P.2d 477 ( 1955); Fuller v. First Security Bank
of Utah, IO U.2d 87, 348 P.2d 930 ( 1960); and Shields
v. Ekman, 67 Utah 474, 248 P. 122 ( 1926).
Thus, it is well established in Utah that the granting
of a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence is:
" ... a matter wholly within the trial court's
discretion. As long as that discretion is not abused.
this court cannot interfere.'' Trimble v. Union
Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P.2d 674
(1943) at 463.
The Trimble case set forth a five-point test for allowing
a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, and
this test has been followed in subsequent cases. A brief
summary of the points are (I) reasonable diligence to
discover the evidence, failure to discover not being the
result of the party's own negligence; (2) the new evidence must not be cumulative; ( 3) the evidence must not
be simply for impeachment; ( 4) the evidence must be
such that the verdict would have been different had the
evidence been introduced at the trial; ( 5) the defeated
party must have had no opportunity to make the defense
or must have been prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident or fraud or improper conduct of the other
party. Id., 105 Utah at 462. In this case, it is submitted
that the passage of eight years without an appearance by
or affidavit of Mr. Hansen is prima facie evidence of a
lack of reasonable diligence. It is further evident that
Mr. Hansen's testimony cannot shed any light on Mr.

29

Scott's intent in taking the vehicle in question and thus
such testimony would be merely cumulative. Likewise,
it is doubtful that Mr. Hansen's testimony would in any
way have changed the outcome of the trial since at most
he could state the same thing to which Mr. Scoville and
Mr. Wilkinson already testified: namely, that the vehicle
in question was taken without permission. Nor is there
any allegation that Mr. Hansen was an eye-witness to
the taking or that he had any knowledge of Scott's in·
tent. Lastly, the defeated party below, plaintiff, had
every opportunity to make the defense that the vehicle
was stolen and was not prevented from making such de·
fense.
More recent cases have affirmed the Trimble test.
Thus, in the case of Smith v. Carroll Realty Co., 8 U.2d
356, 335 P .2d 67 ( 1959) the Court sustained a verdict
denying a new trial; and focused on the "reasonable dili·
gence" test:

" ... [T]he showing made is not persuasive of the
fact that defendant had used the due diligence re·
quired to satisfy the granting of a new trial. De· '
f endants failed to request a continuance to enable
them to make a proper search which would have
been consistent with their know ledge of the exist·
ence of the documents. We are likewise of the
opinion that the trial court was justified in his be·
lief that the newly discovered evidence did not
satisfy the conditions mentioned in Trimble v.
Union Pacific Stages .... " Id., 8 U.2d at 361.
As was stated in the case of Hydraulic Cement Block
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Company v. Christensen, 38 Utah 525, 115 P. 524
(1911 ) , concerning due diligence:

in this regard presents a case where,
trial, a defea.ted party begins to look up the
evidence to sustam the allerrahons contained in
his pleading. Courts cannot
new trials merely because a defeated party, after an adverse decision, makes a showing that upon a second trial
he can produce additional evidence in support of
his contentions which will probably turn the decision in his favor. * * In this case there is no
showing whatever that the plaintiff used any diligence to produce the alleged newly discovered
evidence at the trial." Id., 38 Utah at 531.
Also on point is Walker
Trust Co. v. New York
Terminal, IO U.2d 210, 350 P.2d 626 (1960), where the
Court stated that it did not appear the evidence could
not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. In
the present case, there is no showing that any attempt
was made to locate Hansen between the time the complaint was originally filed in October of 1963 and the
time of the second trial in 1971. Nor is there any showing
that Hansen was unavailable or unable to be located during that period.
The case of Kettner v. Snow, 13 U.2d 382, 375 P.2d
28 (1962), dealt with the requirement that the new evidence be such that the outcome of the trial would have
been different. The Court held that the new evidence
there:
that
cannot be" ... appears to be so
lieve there is any likelihood that it would produce a different result." Id., 13 U.2d at 385.

In this case there is no indication that even if Mr. Han.
sen can testify as to the repossession and parking of tht
vehicle, his testimony will in any way lead to the conclu.
sion that lHr. Scott stole the vehicle, especially in view 01
the fact that nowhere does the affidavit indicate anr
other knowledge on Mr. Hansen's part other than the
details of the repossession and parking. For example
there is no indication that J.\i1r. Hansen could testify as to
Scott's intent in taking the vehicle. Thus, a new trial
not justified.
The cases cited by plaintiff in its brief are not inap·
posite. The case of Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122
not in point inasmuch as there the trial court granted thr
new trial and the Supreme Court, recognizing the trial
court's discretion to grant or deny such a trial, affirmed.
Based on the case of Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347,
plaintiff would have the court believe that the only cri·
teria for a new trial is that a key witness was not
held as an "ace in the hole." In that case the newly dis·
covered eYidence was much more vital than in the presen!
case and further, contrary to plaintiff's interpretation.
the Court in that case made it clear that for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, there must be a
showing that the moving party was not negligent in fail·
ing to obtain the witness for trial. Further, the Cour!
noted that it must appear likely that the new evidence
would change the result. Id., 89 Utah at 380. Thus.
plaintiff's cases are not persuasive here.
It is lastly to be noted that the form of
motion for a new trial was insufficient, and upon thb
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basis alone the decision of the trial court was correct.
Specifically, plaintiff's motion was based upon Rule 59
U.R.C.P. (R. 153) and accompanied by two affidavits
(R. 151, 159), such affidavits containing a mere outline
of plaintiff's "new evidence'' and being signed not by the
"new witness" Nlr. Hansen, but being signed by plaintiff's attorney and by plaintiff's president who testified
at trial. Such a form is inadequate under Rule 59. In the
case of Marnhall's U.S. Auto Supply v. Cashman, I l l
F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 667
(1940) , the court denied a motion for a new trial based
on newly-discovered evidence, stating:
"But the substance of the evidence, the witnesses
from whom or the sources from which it could be
obtained, the diligence which had been exercised,
and the reasons which prevented its production at
the trial were not set forth even in a sketchy manner. Neither was it alleged iu any form that the
evidence was of such character that it would probably change the results .... A motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence must
show that the evidence was discovered since the
trial· must show facts from which the court may
reasonable diligence en the part of the
movant ... and must show that it is of such character that on a new trial such evidence will probably produce a different result.'' Id., 111 F.2d at
141, 142.

This same rule was voiced in Moore's Federal Practice
where it is stated, in commenting upon a case concerning Rule 59:
"The court intimates that mere
by a.ttorneys stating what they believe witnesses will

y to are hearsay and not sufficient upon
wluch to base an order for new trial for newly discovered evidence. . . . Undoubtedly the movan!
should, if feasible, support his motion with the
affidavits of the witnesses as to the proposed new
testimony." 6A Moore's Federal Practice, Par.
59.08 (3).

In this case the affidavits in question were first, signed
by plaintiff's attorney and president and not by the pro.
posed witness; second, consisted of only a conclusory
statement as to Mr. Hansen's proposed testimony but did
not state the substance of such testimony; third, made
only a conclusory statement that the evidence could not
have been discovered without due diligence, even though
the action was begun over eight years ago ; and fourth,
did not allege or demonstrate that the evidence would
probably lead to a different result. These affidavits are
inadequate to support a motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above considerations, the findingi
and conclusions of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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